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Sex Equality ~nd the Law of Employment 
John Dawson• 
New Zealand statutes appear to ban sex discrimination .in employment with the aim 
of promoting equal opponunities for women. But what vision of 1 equality' for women is to 
be found in the law? Does it only require the ~.equal' woman to be treated as if she were a 
man? Or does the law recognise that women may not be similarly situated to men and so 
may not be satisfied with identical treatment under gender neutral norms if the outcome of 
such treatment is to place them at a disadvantage? This paper tries to app~oach these 
questions by outlining a feminist analysis of anti-discrimination law in gene~al, then applying 
it to the broad structure of employment discrimination law in New Zealand. 
A feminist analysis of anti-discrimination law 
This paper considers the relevance to our ·employment law of two contemporary 
feminist criticisms of the substantive aspects of anti-discrimination law. The frrst criticism 
is that the law continues to be based on a male no1n1. Orthodox equality law requires that 
women who are similarly situated to men be treated the same as men. This ignores the social 
fact that men and women are not similarly situated in an unequal society, in which men and 
women do not, in general, have the same freedom or the same access to resources or the same 
bargaining power. It also fails to recognise sex discrimination at all in situations which are 
specific to women. In other words, orthodox law provides a limited and unsatisfactory 
answer to the question: what is discrimination? The result is that many of the barriers to 
success or advancement ~experienced by working women have no legal remedy, even in 
principle. I will return and develop this argument in a moment. 
A second major criticism of anti-discrimination law is linked to the wider feminist 
critique of the role of law as a major support of the 'public/private' distinction. In the past 
the law has actively supported and recreated that distinction through legal barriers to women's 
access to the 'public' zone (e.g., through denial of married women's property rights, lack of 
the franchise) and through failures to protect women from abuse by men within the so-called 
'private' zone (e.g., by failure to criminalise rape or assault within marriage, the absence of 
adequate divorce or abortion legislation). Now criticism focuses more on the law's failure 
to recognise the linkage between these two zones of life (e.g., in the law's failure to 
acknowledge that the division of domestic labour and childcare responsibilities within the 
family directly impacts on employment opportunities). The law continues to be based on a 
model of separate spheres rather than one of interdependence . 
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My concern is to explore the type of equaUty for wo•nen our law might deliver if it 
was fully implemented. Many other criticisnJs might be made of the way in which the law 
is implemented. These might conce~n proct;dural, evidential and attitudinal barriers to 
bringing successful complaints of disainrination; or highlight the capacity for the law's 
intentions to be subvetted by other econon"ric and social policies followed within a 'free' 
market Older in the era of the shrinking state. For the most part these issues are left for 
another day. 
Difference/dominance 
The criticism that anti-disc1iminadon law continues to be based on the maJe no1m is 
p1imarily associated with the work of Catharine Maclrinnon, an Ame1ican law professor and 
feminist activist, who was the author, with Andrea Dwoaldn, of the famed Indianapolis anti-
pornography Oidinance. Her books, Se.mal Harassment ofWorlcing Women (1979), Feminism 
Unmodified (1987) and Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (1989), are core texts of 
contemporary feminist legal theory. 
Mackinnon's (1987) analysis of ~ti-disc1imination law opens with two questions: 
'What is a gender question a question of? What is an inequality question a question ofl' 
(p.32). The answer that orthodox American sex discrimination law has given to these 
questions, she argues, is that gender inequality questions are questions of diffe1ence and 
sameness. The law has been based on the ethical principle that people who are simiJarly 
situated should be treated the same, and that people who are differently situated may be 
treated differently. Aristotle is baditionally quoted as the source of this ethic. Writing in a 
society in which slavery and prostitution were enden1ic and women non-citizens, Aristotle1 
wrote: 'Things that are aUke should be treated a1ike, while things that are una1ike should be 
treated unalike in propo1tion to their unaHkeness.' 
Anti-disc1imination law in Aanaica, based on that proposition, has sought to detelauine 
when women are in the same position as niCn and so should be subject to gender neutral 
laws; and when women are in a different position to men and so may legitimately be treated 
differently. The problem with this approach, says Macldnnon (1991), is that it leaves 
unquestioned 'how difference is socially created or defined, who sets the point of reference 
for sameness, or the comparative empirical approach itself' (p.1287). She asks: 'Since aocn 
have defined women as different to the extent that they are female, can women be entitled 
to equal treatment only to the extent that they are not won'C(n?' (Ibid). 
The question being asked by the law is: are wonen like or unlike men? So this 
approach is based on the male no1m and is 'essentiaUy assimiJationist' (1991: 1288). It says, 
'Be like us and we will treat you like we beat each other' (Ibid). Women have to be the 
same as men to be treated equaJJy. 
This approach has not been totally without advantages for won-en: e.g., some woancn 
have gained access to so•• ae professions by this n eans. But one of its main outcomes has also 
been to empower men to claim those few benefits to which wonen have previously been 
entitled: e.g., by successfully attacldng the 'mother principle' foianerly followed in child 
custody cases. This is because the main outcome of this approach in practice has been the 
1 In Bthica Nicbomachea, bk v3, 1131&, 1131b rN Ross bans 1925), quoted in MackiDnon, C. (1991) 
1286. 
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recasting of laws in gender-neutral tettns. As Mackinnon notes: 'The operative view has been 
that if classifications that distinguish by sex were eliminated from law, sex equality would 
be achieved' (1991: 1292). 
But gender-neutral classification itself does not ensure equality of outcome in fact. 
At the University of Otago, for example, when gender-neutral rules have been applied to 
professorial appointments, men have been appointed to chairs in what was the Home Science 
School, but very few women have been appointed to chairs in other depwtnaents or schools. 
In recent years, the number of women professors has actually declined. Is this equality? The 
strict application of gender-neutral rules may even prevent affnmative action programmes, 
which attempt to redress social inequalities by singling out disadvantaged groups for 
promotion, for the application of the gender-neutral principle results in affnmative action 
being seen as an illegitimate fotm of preference. 
An even more powerful criticism of this sameness/difference approach to sex 
discrimination law, from Mackinnon's perspective, is that it fails to identify those situations 
in which women are treated unlike men as involving sex discrimination at all: because, 'where 
the sexes are different ... discrimination as a legal theory does not even ~come up' (1991: 
1288-89). Legal differences based on real distinctions between men and women w-e not 
considered unequal treatment at all. So, for example, laws that pettnit the exclusion of 
pregnancy costs or childbirth expenses from insurance cover may not be considered 
discriminatory. As men cannot become pregnant or bear children, men and women are not 
similarly situated in this regard, so a legal distinction may be considered legitimate (see 
Geduldig v Aiello, 1974.; General Electric v Gilbert, 1976; Dickens, 1991; Fredman, 1992). 
So Mackinnon rejects the sameness/difference approach to discrimination law and its 
implicit foundation on the male notm. For her, equality questions are not questions of 
sameness and ,difference. They are not 'ethical' questions at all. They are 'political' 
questions, of dominance and subordination, power and hierarchy. She advocates an 
alternative, 'dominance/subordinance' approach. This would focus on situations in which the 
position of women is generally unlike that of men: e.g., the position of women as victims of 
sexual violence and pornography. For her, the appropriate focus of sex discrimination law 
would be to change social situations in which women are rendered victims: to use law as an 
instrument to achieve structural social change to redress ·the substantively unequal position 
of women. She thus imagines a different role for law than the traditional liberal view of it. 
The traditional liberal approach is to view law as some kind of independent referee: as a 
neutral enforcer of the ethical principle of equality - an approach that does not fequire any 
affnmative action, structural change, group analysis or focus on outcomes. 
For Mackinnon, law should not pretend to be neutral, which it never has been with 
respect to women anyway. It should, if possible, be used by women as a political weapon, 
in a practice of feminist politics, to force the structural changes required to produce 
substantive ~equality and an end to victimisation: e.g., by requiring employers to adopt 
affnauative action programmes, and by attacking through law the pornography industry. The 
a.im is the end of male dominance in all spheres of social life, equality of power and authority 
for women and equal distribution of economic benefits. 
But such active promotion of the position of women poses a problem for orthodox 
discrimination law, which is based on the principle of gender neutrality. To quo~ 
Mackinnon: 'If differentiation into classifications, in itself, is discrimination, as it is in 
difference doctrine, ·the use of law to change group-based social inequalities becomes 
problematic, even contradictory' (1987: 42). Again: 'H differentiation is discrimination, 
affnrnative action, and any legal ~change in social inequality is discrimination' (Ibid). So, 
.. 
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affutnative action progta•n•11es for women in employmeat are attacked or disc1f:dited because 
they treat women diffc:rendy and so disc1iminatc against individual tncn; as, m the New 
Zealand context, affun,ativc action prog~anunes for Maori 81'e desCJ:ibed by sone as f01•ns 
of 'apartheid' or 'special tteauncnt'. 
The outcome, argues Mackinnon, can be that orthodox difference/sameness sex 
discrimination law becona another neans of legitimating the status quo. Attempts to redress 
social inequaHties by law, through singling out disadvantaged groups for special attention, 
may be classified as diSCiiminatOiy thc•uselves. The effect of focusing on difference is to 
perpetuate dominance; and to fail to attack through law those situations in which won en are 
treated most differently to men. 
Application to the law of employment 
I now wish to consider in more detail how this type of analysis would apply in the 
area of employment. I believe its application would cause us to ask of employment 
discrimination law the following kinds of questions: 
First, does the definition of sex disctimination in employment focus exclusively on 
'similarly situated' male and female employees, requiring them to be dealt with under gender 
neutral nmans, or can 'disctimination' encompass situations in which naco and women are not 
'similarly situated' at all? For example, can it extend to cover wonJCn-specific injuries in the 
workplace, or factors in the organisation of work itself that particularly disadvantage many 
women, because of their different life patterns? Second, arc affirmative action prop·ammes 
for women required, or pCI•nitted, or prohibited? And third, does the law address the linkages 
between the so-called 'public' and 'private' zones of life? 
Mackinnon's analysis would lead us to consider insufficient a legal reginAC limited to 
the comparison of the positions of 'si•nilady situated' n-cn and won•en within the work 
environment It would lead us to favour a legal regime that not only pCI•rdts but forces 
structural changes in the organisation of work itself, which defines women-specific injuries 
as sex discrimination, which requires affa•native action, and which seeks to modify factots 
within the 'private' zone which i•npact on e•nploynent oppo1tonities. At the least, the 
analysis would encourage us to value legal developments which bring us closer to these goals . 
So how does New Zealand law neasure up when subject to this fotm of analysis? 
There are several statutes in force in New Zalland conce1uing sex discrimination law in 
employment: e.g., the Equal Pay Act 1972, the Human Rights Con1mission Act 1977, the 
Parental I .eave and Employment Protection Act 1987 and the State Sector Act 1988. Thete 
are provisions concetning access to pCisonal grievance procedures for discrimination or sexual 
harassment in the Employ•nent Contracts Act 1991. The definition of rape in the Crimes Act 
1961 is relevant; plus, of course, the E••tployment Equity Act 1990 which bla7£d like a con1et 
across our legal sky. 
The defmition of discrimination 
The Human Rights Conamission Act bans discrindnadon in e••aploynl£nt and entry into 
partnerships 'by reason of' sex or matital status. Section 15(1) provides: 
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employed in substantially simUar circumstances' the inta~pmtation of disc1hnination 
by the Tribunal does pe1nlit the provision of renr,edies in SQJnc situations whe1e w t II ...-11 
treated diffe1ently to men. Not all ttea1JPCDt based on differences is considmed legidma• 
Indirect discrimination 
But there are clearly linrits to how far the statutory definition of discrimination 
be extended. This beconres apparent when we consider the likely legal response 
complaints of 'indirect' disc1imination; i.e., COJnplaints conceiuing requirements or __ ......... 
of work which appear on their face to apply equally to both sexes but which in 
disproportionately disadvantage many woanen because of their different life patterns: e.s., 
conditions of employment requiring extensive travel, or early evening shifts, or 
in sports or service clubs to attract clients. 
What would be the response, for exantple, to a co•nplaint of relatiaa 
to the requirement in sanae occupations that employees work long hours, without · 
arrangements or childcare facilities being provided? Imagine an executive position It 
advertised which requires of the canploycc 'one bundled percent coanmittncnt' and a sq 
hour week. Two women with young children joindy apply for the position on a job-shariaJ 
basis. They both have superior quaUfications to all other applicants. They are not employed. 
Have they been discriminated against? Has the employer refused to employ them 'by reasoD 
of their sex', contrary to s15(1)(a)? Or have they been refused by reason of their failure to 
meet the specified conditions of employn;ent which we1e offered on a fo1•naJJy equal bull 
to members of both sexes? Can the law ~gnise diSCiimination in situations where fo1•naJJy 
',equal' conditions of employnlCnt ;,,,pact diffmendy on the sexes? Would the woancn's lifo 
patterns, not the offer of inflexible wmldng conditions, be considered the cause of their failure 
to gain employment? 
Here we must consider the televance of s27 of the Human Rights Com••dssion Act, 
prohibiting 'disaimination by subteifuge'. This provision is treated by the Bqual 
Opportunities Tribunal in Proc~~dlngs CommlssioMr v Air New Zealand (1989). The 
Tribunal's analysis of the requiren-cnts of s27 recognises the expansive and 'progressive' 
approach to 'indirect' disahnination taken in the United States and England and accepts that 
an omission to take action to mnwJy past diSCiiminatory practices can constitute 
'discrimination' under the Act. 827 was found bleached by an apparently 'neutral' conditioa 
of employment which had the effect of perpetuating a prior patte111 of discrimination. To 
establish a breach of s27 the compla;nant nmst show that a requirement or condition of 
employment exists which is not appatendy in contravention of the Act; that this bas the effect 
of giving preference to a male (or males); and that the preference occurs in a situation whell 
the giving of preference to a male would be unlawful. It then falls on the defendant to trJ 
to show there is a 'good reason' for the i•nposition of the requiren-cnt or condition and • 
show that its imposition is not a subteifoge to avoid complying with the law. But the CUI 
law provides little guidance as to wbich 'good reasons' will be aa:;eptable. Will maqina1 
contributions to business efficiency or profitability be consideraJ sufficient? (See Ralnq Y 
Greater Glasgow Health Board, 1987; Dickens, 1991; F1edman, 1992). 
Returning to the earlier exaanple, if the employer can show that clients prefer to deal 
with a full-time employee rather than the piiiDCII in a : arrangement will that 
justify the omission to employ the two wonxa? Perhaps not, if die Tribunal CODiinues to taJce 
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a remedial and expansive view of the Act's prohibition of indirect discrimination and 
discrimination by omission. Alternatively, the Tribunal may take a more restrictive approach 
based on the language of s15. S15(1)(b) suggests that offering the 'same' conditions of work 
to both sexes is all that is necessary. Comparisons are to be made between persons employed 
in 'substantially similar circumstances'. But this begs the question, of course, as to whether 
identical conditions are 'the same' for differently situated employees. 
The differential impact on some women of identical working conditions to men may 
not be considered the responsibility of employers, or discrimination. It may be considered 
the result of general social patterns beyond employers' control or 'lifestyle choices' made by 
the women themselves; though this may ignore the extent to which past employment practices 
have themselves shaped those patterns and 'choices'. Certain! y there is little evidence in the 
I!eported decisions of the Tribunal that complaints concerning the structure of the 'not n1al' 
working week will be successful. To this extent women are bound to male work notms, 
although fottnally gender-neutral standards are applied. Social factors which mean women 
may not seek to work in identical conditions to men are not recognised in this model. 
Affirmative action 
There is nothing in the Human Rights Commission Act or elsewhere which requires 
employers to adopt affn1native action programmes for women. Indeed, under s15's definition 
of discrimination these may be considered to discriminate against men, if they result in 
employers refusing to ~employ or promote men 'by reason of their sex. This is spelled out 
in Parr's case where it was said it would be discriminatory to prefer a man over a more 
qualified woman for the purposes of achieving a better balance of the sexes in a particular 
area of work. The Tribunal found: 'The Act does not pe1nrit the selection of applicants in 
order to achieve a balance of the sexes. Such a concept is contrary to the letter and spirit of 
the Act' (Pa" v BCNZ, 1987: 95,572). This would prevent the use of 'strong' affnmative 
action programmes which petmit the appointment of a woman over a better qualified male 
applicant. Where the applicants are equally qualified, the choice of ~either would ,always be 
open, so to deliberately choose the woman may be considered legitimate. This may save 
'weak' programmes, or the 'plus factor' approach, though this is debateable. 
A specific exception is provided by s28 which pe1mits the Commission to approve 
affntnative action programmes for women which are submitted to it. Nothing requires 
employers to dev,elop programmes or to submit them. The development of 'equal 
employment opportunities progtammes' in government departments and education services 
is legally required by ss58 and 77D State Sector Act. Management must publish the 
programme, ensure compliance and report publicly on implementation. This was also the 
focus of the second aspect of the Employment Equity Act 1990. It would have required all 
major employers in the state and the private sectors (Backgrounder, 1989) 'to develop equal 
employment opportunities progtammes aimed at the identification and elimination of all 
aspects of policies, procedures and other institutional barriers that cause or perpetuate 
inequality'. Monitoring procedures were established to scrutinise employers' adherence. 
Flexible working hours, job-sharing, seniority for part-time workers, recognition of different 
skills or qualifications - significant changes to the structure of working life in all major areas 
of employment may possibly have been stimulated by the implementation of such 
programmes. This requirement also is now repealed, although the provisions in the State 
Sector Act remain (see Tremaine, 1991). 
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Rates of pay 
With regard to pay, the law is still substantiaJJy based on a model involving the 
comparison of 'similarly situated' •ncn and wonen. The effect of the Equal Pay Act is to 
require individuals working in the sa•ne or substantiaJJy sianilar jobs to be paid the same 
regardless of their sex. It prohibits differential pay rates between 'similarly situated' men and 
women (ss6(8),7) and bans sex-based classification of work tasks (s3(3)). But the Act has 
not redressed pay differentials between occupational cluses, i.e., it has not prevented 
occupations dominated by women (e.g., nursing) receiving lower rates of pay than occupations 
dominated by men (e.g., policing). That claims across occupational classes (what we now call 
pay equity claims) could not succeed under the Equal Pay Act was made clear by the 
Arbitration Court in 1986 when it held it did not have the jurisdiction to hear such a claim 
(NZ Clerical Administrative etc IAOW v Farmers Trading Co Ltd and others, 1986). 
This, of course, was a key objective behind the Employment Equity Act 1990. That 
statute would have perrnitted large-scale comparisons to be made across occupational 
catego1ies. It could have led progressively to significant changes in rates of pay throughout 
the workforce. It was explicitly aimed at achieving the type of structural changes a feminist 
approach would favour; hence, perhaps, the strength of the successful opposition to it 
Now the implementation of the Equal Pay Act itself may be hindered by the new 
employment environment in the wake of the Employuent Contracts Act. It may be more 
difficult to measure 'equal pay' between work performed by men and women, for two 
reasons. First, employment contracts will become less public. The rates of pay established 
by national awards were in the public domain, but much less infotauation will be available 
concerning wages or salaries set by individual (and even small collective) employment 
contracts. Second, widely varying rewards may bccoane established for similar work, in 
different regions, firms or industries, making it much lll01'C difficult to measure 'equal pay'. 
In a situation of greater wage pluralism there will clearly be increased difficulties in 
establishing that the wage differential between a male employee and female employee is 
'based on the sex of the employees' (Equal Pay Act, s2). So a further difficulty is added to 
the fmntidable problems in establishing what dete1auines rates of pay (see also Szyszczak, 
1985). 
Women-specific injuries 
During the 1980s the law has moved to recognise wonen-specific workplace injuries 
as sex discrimination. Sexual harassment was recognised by the Equal Opportunities Tribunal 
as a form of sex discrimination under the Human Rights Commission Act, although it is not 
mentioned in the legislation. The Labour Relations Act 1987 then recognised sexual 
harassment as a fmn1 of personal grievance for unionised wo1k:crs (sec Boast, 1988). The 
Employ•rent Contracts Act 1991 has extended this cover to all workers (ss27,29). Every 
employment contract must have (or is deemed to have) an effective procedure for the 
resolution of such grievances (s32). In considering a complaint of sexual harass•nent no 
account is to be taken of the victim's sexual experience or reputation (s35). Employers are 
responsible for taking steps to prevent sexual harassment by other workers, clients or 
customers following complaints (s36). Employees who sexually harass co-workers may be 
dismissed, provided correct dismissal procedures are followed (see Coleman, 1988). 
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The Rape Law Refotm Act 1985 also created a new offence of inducing sexual 
• • • 
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that iD Swaden where an extaiSive system of benefits exists to provide a 
propm lioa of tho employee's usual le'"Uneration, both during initial parental leave and during 
periods of later leave taken to cam for an unwoll cbild Widcnberg,1991). 
It is hard 10 govcrn••ent spoDIOI'Bhip of such dcvclopnents. in the CUl'l'ent 
political climate. Opposing argu•ncots based on cost, flcalom of contract and the defence of 
econonnc efficiency Hkely to pevail. The model of separate spheres is set to continue, 
with diSCiimination viewed as 'a problem expaienced by individual won en within selected 
areas of their lives' (Dickens, 1991: 293). 
Conclusion 
How, then, should we answer the question posed at the swt of this paper? What 
vision of equality for won en is to be found in New ~aland law? We have seen that our law 
does not provide a clear vision of the 'equal' WOill&n employee at all, but a plausible 
composite portrait would be of an individual who has made 'private' arrangements for 
childcare and do•nestic labour responsibilities. In general, won reo are to be granted access 
on an identical basis to ""'n to identical conditions of wo1k:. They are to be ffce of oven 
sexual harassment and sexual coercion in the work environ11ent. They are not to suffer 
detriment due to pregnancy and are entided, with their partnms, to unpaid parental leave and 
to return to their jobs. But the law gives little attention to worldng women's other concerns, 
about sharing donaestic labour with unwilling men, about the structme of the orthodox 
working week, about poor wages in female-dominated occupations and about the reluctance 
of the 'captains' of industry to actively pro•note women's oppoitunities. These may be 
impo11ant concmns of working won en. They arc not at present legal concerns. 
The sex disc1imination statutes govmning employ•ncnt passed in this country in the 
1970s, while they were advances which helped create a political climate in which further 
refot•ns such as the Employ•nent Equity Act were possible, are now wlncrable to feminist 
criticis•n. They are largely based on a model involving gender-neutral comparisons between 
individuals, though creative intciprctation by the Equal ·ues Tribunal of the 
meaning of diSClimination has rendered unlawful sanae practices of which women are the 
main victims. But the scope of women-specific injuries which will be considered unlawful 
is limited and may not extend to many foi•ns of 'indirect' In the 1980s we 
have seen a distinct move, led by the women members of the fourth Labour Goveit•ment, to 
adopt some public policies aiJJYd at achieving structural changes, such as alteiations in the 
organisation of work itself, class-based wage comparisons and subsidisation of childcare. 
Now, in the 1990s we are starting to see some of those developments rolled back as a 
feminist perspective no longer influences goverunent policy. Rather than the law moving 
forwud to explicidy 1ccognise tho 1inkages between tho 'public' and 'private' zones, we see 
instead, in the Employment Contracts Act, the beginning of a NmnceptuaUsation of the zone 
of employment as itself a 'private' zone, in which 8D'IIlgenents will be made between 
'individuals'. This augurs badly for feminists who seek to rely on inequalities in outcomes 
between groups of nen and w01nen as a justification for legal refm•n. 
It also challenges the idea that progress towards fe•ninist legal objectives is an 
inevitable, evolutionary process, in which the law simply comes to reflect underlying social 
movements. The law can also frustta1e and even reverse social movements. The legal 
progress of the last century, fi:om the Married Won +en's Piopaty Act 1884, through electoral 
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refoiiD, entry to the professions, equal pay, the Human Rights Commission Act, to pay equity 
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